Propagation of social representations by Lahlou, Saadi
  
Saadi Lahlou
Propagation of social representations 
 




Lahlou, Saadi (1996) Propagation of social representations. Journal for the theory of social 
behaviour, 26 (2). pp. 157-175. ISSN 0021-8308  
DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-5914.1996.tb00527.x
 
© 1996 John Wiley and Sons
 
This version available at: http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/29176/
Available in LSE Research Online: March 2011 
 
LSE has developed LSE Research Online so that users may access research output of the 
School. Copyright © and Moral Rights for the papers on this site are retained by the individual 
authors and/or other copyright owners. Users may download and/or print one copy of any 
article(s) in LSE Research Online to facilitate their private study or for non-commercial research. 
You may not engage in further distribution of the material or use it for any profit-making activities 
or any commercial gain. You may freely distribute the URL (http://eprints.lse.ac.uk) of the LSE 
Research Online website.  
 
This document is the author’s final manuscript accepted version of the journal article, 
incorporating any revisions agreed during the peer review process.  Some differences between 
this version and the published version may remain.  You are advised to consult the publisher’s 
LAHLOU, Saadi(1996) - The propagation of social representations. Journal for the Theory of Social 












Author’s address : 
Saadi Lahlou. EDF-DER and EHESS Laboratoire de Psychologie Sociale, Paris. 





Abstract : Based on a minimal formalism of social representations as a set of associated 
cognems, a simple model of propagation of representations is presented. Assuming that 
subjects share the constitutive cognems, the model proposes that mere focused attention on 
the set of cognems in the field of common conscience may replicate the pattern of 
representation from context into subjects, or, from subject to subject, through actualization by 
language, where cognems are represented by verbal signs. Limits of the model are discussed, 
and evolutionist perspectives are presented with the support of field data. 
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 1. Sharing objects 
A group can only be called such if, among other things, it shares a common « reality », that is 
a set of objects, material or other, upon which and with which its members interact. This 
trivial precondition seems confirmed by any superficial observation of human groups, and has 
been recognized since the beginning of social science (e.g. Durkheim, 1912, 1991, p. 64) as a 
prerequisite to any form of human social life. For instance, communication, as any form of 
co-operation, is not possible without the basic sharing of some « context » or « content » 
between actors.  
Still, as for many "trivialities", close investigation reveals that what seems at first obvious is 
not so simple to describe. Centuries of philosophical and physical research still have not 
solved the first part of the problem : what are « the material objects » of our common reality, 
what is the physical context we believe to share with other beings ? At best, research in 
Physics or Epistemology, considering that we have direct access only to representations, have 
sent back the problem into the domain of the other fold of the question : « what are the "other 
objects" -that is : representations- that we share? ». For instance, Zafiropoulo (1967, p. 5) 
considers that :  
« Reality is at each age the set of concepts used to classify our perceptions (...) in other words, 
reality is a necessary but transient definition ». 
In fact, it seems that the core of the problem is "what is the nature of that something that 
observers believe to share?". And in this question every single word is a trap in itself. So we 
shall leave it open, in its complexity, for future generations. Our point here will be a more 
modest approach, in a genetic perspective, of the term « share »: how do we come to share 
common objects, whatever their nature ?  
We shall first focus on how social representations propagate in a population. After giving a 
minimal definition of how a social representation can be described (section 1), we will 
illustrate how the sharing can be figured (section 2), then propose a basic model of 
propagation (section 3), with its limitations (section 4), and some empirical illustration 
(section 5). In so doing, the model will be extended, with a more detailed approach of how 
social representations are embedded in a global context, including « material » objects 
(section 6). We conclude (section 7) with the presentation of an evolutionist perspective, in 
which the propagation mechanism appears as a key feature of social representations. 
 
2. Representation as an association of cognems 
Social psychology, exploring the question of "community" and "meaning", came up with the 
notion of social representation (Moscovici, 1961, 1982, 1989). This productive concept is 
more or less a scientific name for those « other » (non material) objects that are shared in a 
group. Those objects that we all believe to exist, but which are so complex and numerous that 
no discipline has yet been able to construct a complete taxonomy within a single theoretical 
framework. This is, in our view, derived from the nature of social representation : as it is a 
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means to convert perception (in the large) into action, and vice-versa, it must be a flexible and 
versatile kind of tool, subject to many avatars. 
 
Social representations have been widely explored, and were given numerous definitions 
(Moscovici, 1961, 1976 ; Jodelet 1984, 1989 ; Doise, 1985 ; Flament 1993 ; Harré 1989...). 
They vary slightly in scope and content, but agree on what Flament (1981)  calls a minimal 
statement : 
 -a representation is a set of cognems ("cognème", Codol, 1969), organized by multiple relations 
- those relations can be oriented (implication, causality, hierarchy...) but all can be "derived" 
into a symmetrical relation expressing the vague idea of "going together" (....) 
- this relation, generally, is not transitive : if A goes with B for some reasons, and B goes with C 
for other reasons, it may well be that A and C have no reason for going together". 
 
This approach, which founds the current empirical approach of social representations and the 
theory of the core or « noyau central » (Abric  1984, 1994; Flament 1992 ; Guimelli & 
Rouquette 1992 ; Guimelli (ed.) 1994) is mostly formal. It tells little about the functional 
aspects of social representations, but gives a good basis for investigation. 
Current cognitive research, insisting on the multimodal aspect of cognition, suggests that 
cognems are of heterogeneous nature. Any object that may appear in the field of individual 
conscience seems a good candidate : perceptions, emotions, memories (which could be 
considered as « replays » of the former categories), motor or hormonal commands... May be 
also « objects » not emergent to conscience may pretend to the status of cognems, but this is 
less clear. We like this definition because it is only a formal one, applying to the concept of 
representation without taking options on functional aspects. It is compatible with our view 
that representation should be considered as an object in itself, and not as a representation « of 
something ». And that is precisely why, as we shall see, it can propagate so easily. For us, 
representation is what it represents (Lahlou, 1995) ; see also Wagner, in this issue, for a 
similar view. Let us stay with this ambiguity, and simply keep in mind that cognems include 
more than verbal or iconic items, and that they may themselves be rather complex elements.  
In other words, "a social representation is a structured set of cognitive elements" (Rouquette, 
1994). It is upon this vague but consensual definition of social representation that we shall 
rely here, assuming that this formalism is fit for describing social representations. So, let us 
say that there are "cognitive elements", or cognems, that a set of cognems that are associated 
("going together") constitute a "representation". And that a "social representation" is a 
representation that is « shared » by a group. 
3. What sharing means 
Having something in common can be illustrated by a simple figure. Two subjects, Alter and 
Ego, each live in their « own world of perception » (Von Uexküll, 1921), which respectively 
include their own perceived objects. Each object is an association of cognems. Some of these 
associations are common to the Ego and Alter. This means that, for an external observer (let 
us call him « Thomas ») describing Alter’s and Ego’s worlds, there seems to be something 
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identical in each of those worlds. It can be represented (within Thomas’ conventions) as 
follows :  
Fig. 1 : Alter & Ego have Something in common 
ego alter 




What they have in common is here symbolized as a set of cognems recognized by Thomas : 
small squares, circles, and an « S » in the figure. Let us suppose « S » is a special kind of 
cognem : a sign of a common language that Ego, Alter, and Thomas all know. To make things 
simple, let us suppose that what (Thomas thinks) Ego and Alter have in common is the 
representation of a chair. And S stands for the word « chair ». 
 
Another way Thomas can represent the situation is : 
Fig. 2 : Figuring the sharing of representation by the sharing of cognems 
ego alter 




In doing so, he supposes that the representation of the chair is strictly identical in both Ego 
and Alter. So he may prefer to restrict prudently to considering that only the explicit, overt 
signs that he can observe are common to Ego and Alter. 
Fig. 3 : Figuring the sharing of representation by the sharing of signs 
ego 
alter 




In doing so, he will only assume that there is at least some signs in common, and probably 
something else, which is more difficult to assess, because an external observer can never be 
quite sure of the limits of what is in common between Ego and Alter. 
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This last figure, close of Wagner’s (1994) calls for some more comments. Cognems are 
difficult to observe. To the external observers, only signs, that is perceptible stimuli, are 
accessible. It is probable, but not certain, that signs are the material cognems are made of, 
since each individual constructs his own representation of his world from perception. Internal 
states, considered from the point of view of the subject, undergo a very similar treatment to 
"external" perceptions. Or, better, all perceptions are at the final stage internal, and therefore, 
of the so called "external" objects, in the mind are only manipulated internal images or 
representations, which Minsky (1985) calls "simuli".  
An ancient idealist position (Parmenides) states that "One cannot know something that doesn't 
exist, nor state it ; since what can be thought and what can exist are the same thing". But this 
is a very complex issue, so we do not wish to venture further at this stage. For the purpose of 
our model, let us only consider that, among cognems, there are some which can be elicited in 
a public space, which we call signs. In figure 3, S, the common part of the representation, will 
at least be constituted by signs. Of what are not signs, we shall not speak, because they cannot 
be talked about. Following Wittgenstein’s (1921) final line of his Tractatus : what cannot be 
spoken about, must be kept silent. Only overt signs are accessible to observers. Cognems will 
be used for our modeling purposes, but for empirical investigations, we shall keep to signs. 
 
Let us call U-language (Lahlou, 1990, 1995), the representational space of an individual. The 
U-language of an individual is a formal space that may contain all the possible combinations 
of his cognems. Roughly, it contains everything that this individual could possibly perceive 
with his sensory and mental equipment. The U-language contains, among other things, what 
the subject would call his world, that is what he believes to exist. But it contains more, 
possible perceptions, just as the natural language may contain sentences that have never yet 
been written or pronounced, but still would be a combination of existing words. We need this 
space for formal purposes : there must be a place to inscribe the new representations.  
We shall consider that representations are common to a set of subjects (Ai) if : 
 (condition a) their constitutive cognems (cj) exist in the U-language of each Ai 
 (condition b) those (cj) are associated in the world of each Ai  
Technically, only signs are accessible to empirical research. So, for research purposes, we 
shall admit that representations are common to a set of subjects if : 
 (condition a’) their constitutive signs (sj) exist in the U-language of each Ai. This 
condition can be assessed by checking, verbally or otherwise, if Ai recognizes each sj. 
 (condition b’) if those (cj) are associated in the world of each Ai. This condition can 
be assessed by eliciting free association by Ai, e.g. with the methods presented by (Guimelli 
& Rouquette, 1992), (Moliner, 1994) or (Lahlou 1993). 
 
Many field works (Jodelet & Ohana, 1989) have evidenced that there are indeed numerous 
shared representations, in the restricted and empirically accessible sense we have just 
described (conditions a’ and b’) : social representations are of that kind. This mental 
epidemiology, showing us social representations as endemic in a population brings the 
question of : how does this come ? Chance is no sufficient explanation for such a widespread 
and improbable distribution of complex objects. 
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 4. Constructing representation 
We believe representations diffuse in a population by two ways : spontaneous emergence, and 
communication, although research has until now mostly focused on the latter. Our basic 
model allows simple description of the processes of emergence and diffusion, which are 
similar anyway. 
If condition a) is satisfied, that is, if the subject’s U-language already contains the necessary 
cognems, then emergence of the representation simply comes by associating durably those 
cognems into a pattern of Ego’s subjective world.  









What can create such association ? It seems that any focus of the subject’s attention on the set 
of elements « as a pattern » will do the trick. Then, the subject’s memory will fix into durable 
association the actualization of this set of cognems, that was once mere co-occurrence, or 
succession, in the field of focused conscience. This is a triviality. Let us describe how the 
process can propagate representation. 
For example, suppose neither Ego nor Alter have ever heard about the concept of « finger-
bowl ». Now Ego enters a French restaurant, orders sea-food, and plays with the objects on 
the table, on which lies a finger-bowl. He tastes the lemon and water in the cup. The waiter, 
passing by, seeing Ego’s strange behavior, tells him « This is a finger-bowl, sir. It is not for 
drinking, but for rinsing your fingers after eating sea-food ». Thomas, sitting at a table nearby, 
observes Ego, and assesses, as he sees Ego tasting the water, then listening to the waiter, that 
Ego has constructed the representation of a finger-bowl, connecting the sight, the feel, the 
taste, the functional script, the meaning, the name... Thomas identifies this representation - 
that he supposes Ego has just gained - with his own social representation of the finger-bowl. 
To sum up, Ego, having already in his world the objects : water, bowl, lemon, finger, sea-
food, the experience of grubby hands, and some other relevant cognems (condition a), has 
associated them (condition b) in a pattern that is the representation of « finger-bowl ». He 
could do so because the situation he lived in the restaurant presented him the various 
components (cognems) as a bundle. This representation has all the social and functional 
aspects of a social representation : it belongs to a given culture, as can be stated by Thomas, 
or the waiter ; it links mental schemes to a certain reality, it is a means of achieving some 
concrete goal, etc. As we shall see later (section 5) this is not accidental : this representation 
was framed by a social context pre-existing before Ego’s visit in the restaurant, and 
transferred into Ego’s mind. 
 
6 
Let us now suppose that the next day Ego meets Alter and shares with him his new 
knowledge.  
He describes, using natural language, the situation, and the object : « I have discovered 
yesterday a new concept when I ate in a French restaurant. It is a bowl, with hot water and a 
slice of lemon in it, and you use it to rinse your grubby fingers after eating sea-food. It is 
called a finger-bowl ». As the bowl, the water etc. are not physically available in the 
immediate common context of Ego and Alter, Ego uses words to actualize them in the 
common representational space, so that they constitute a set presented to Alter’s attention. 
Ego does this so that Alter’s memory « will fix into durable association the actualization of 
this set of cognems, that only was once co-occurrence, or in succession, in the field of focused 
conscience ». In the end, we (or eavesdropping Thomas) can suppose Alter has now 
internalized the representation of the finger-bowl. This can be easily assessed by investigating 
Alter for conditions a’ and b’, with protocols that are left to the imagination of the reader. 
So the process is progressive: first, Ego actualizes the relevant cognems in Alter’s 
representational space. Then Alter’s attention focuses on the pattern they make. Then Alter’s 
memory fixes the association between cognems. As we have stated, this is only possible if 
Alter previously has the relevant cognems (cj) available in his representational world 
(condition a), a premise that Ego will probably check if he is not sure that Alter has them. 
Another condition is that Alter also has available the set (sj) of signs representing 
conventionally all the relevant cj, since the propagation from Ego to Alter will be done 
through the use of (sj). This checking (usually considered as unnecessary between subjects of 
the same culture) is a preliminary phase. All this process can be figured as follows : 
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Fig. 5.1. : Preliminary : ensuring Alter has the right basic cognems  
ego 
alter 




Fig. 5.2. : Actualizing the cognems in a common representational space 
ego 
alter 
ego's world  alter's world
FB 
common representational space  




ego's world  alter's world
FB 
common representational space  
Fig. 5.4 : Final state : the representation has propagated from Ego to Alter 
ego alter 




To summarize the two propagation processes, representation has propagated (from the context 
to Ego, or from Ego to Alter) by replicating, in a way that is a bit similar to viruses. Ego’s 
representation created a replica of its pattern within Alter by using Alter’s own cognems, and 
having Alter’s mental processes binding them in the right pattern. 
It is worth noticing that, in propagating to Alter, the representation has not disappeared from 
Ego. Unlike matter, information does not obey to the law of mass conservation (Brunet, 
1990). It could even be said that on the contrary it probably reinforced in Ego : persuading or 
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teaching someone is a well-known way of reinforcing belief and learning. This can be 
accounted for by the model : when actualizing the cognems in the common representational 
space, Ego not only focuses Alter’s memory on the representational pattern, but also his own, 
hereby strengthening his own associations between the cognems. 
 
Our model more or less generalizes and formalizes the process described by (Sperber, 1989) 
in his epidemiological approach of representations :  
« Among mental representations, some -a very small proportion - are communicated, that is 
bring their user to produce public representation which in turn brings another individual to build 
up a mental representation which content is similar to the initial representation. Amongst the 
communicated representations, some -a very small proportion - are communicated repeatedly 
and eventually come to be distributed over the whole group, that is have a mental version within 
each group member. » 
Sperber calls cultural representations those widely and durably distributed representations ; 
clearly, they could also be called social representations. 
 
Being a handy simplification is the purpose of models, and this simple model easily claims to 
account for the spreading of representations within large populations of humans. It also 
pretends to account for the fact that those representations can be adapted to an external 
context, since -as we have seen in the first part with the example of the finger-bowl- any 
object can propagate its own structure as a representation in the subject’s internal world, 
through the mere process of perception and attention. Humans, and non-Human objects have 
a symmetrical role in propagating representations ; the difference being is that Human-to-
Human communication tends to favor using a system of signs, when non-Humans-to-Human 
tends to use more perceptual cognems.  
But of course, our model is too simplified. No one would expect that a model using a couple 
of signs and figures could account for phenomena which we know use configurations of 
billions of neurons. Let us examine some of its limits. 
 
5. Limits of the model 
5.1. Not all cognems are overt signs 
Internal representations have other components than signs, e.g. kinestesic, emotional... They 
can hardly be abstracted from their sensory-motor context, as one can expect from their 
behavioral function. The material on which the researcher should ideally investigate is what 
Flament (1989) calls “a praxeo-discursive corpus, including the record of all practice and 
discourse of (the) population”. In fact, research mostly focuses on verbal signs, and some 
other overt behavior accessible to observation. This is a strong limit to applying or falsifying 
the model. All that can be checked is the transmission of the (sj), and, even with brain 
imagery, the observer, external by construction, will never have access to the cognems (cj) 
which remain theoretical objects. 
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Still, as overt (sj) are precisely the elements used by Ego and Alter to propagate the 
representation, this may not be so crucial a limitation. In fact, a properly falsifiable theory 
would be one that defines social representations as only constituted of (sj). (And indeed a 
closer epistemological look at our formalism would unveil that it is actually the case in our 
model, since (cj) is a set of objects in our descriptive formalism, therefore having the status of 
signs.) 
Still, one should keep in mind that what is transmitted through signs is more than the signs 
themselves. Participants already share a large amount of experience which is not observable 
during the transaction, but nevertheless is active in the process. For example, when Ego says 
« water » and « lemon » he actualizes in Alter’s conscience more than the words themselves, 
a complex and vast network of multimodal memories of Alter’s past experiences with waters 
and lemons. Then, what Alter will bind together as the representation of the finger-bowl will 
probably be a complex multimodal set of cognems including those memories, and not only 
the observable signs which Thomas heard Ego pronounce. Through communications of words 
or other observable signs, more can be transmitted than the perceptible (signs) part. It is like 
manipulating a suitcase by the handle. One can pass it to someone else just by passing the 
handle.  
 
5.2. Not all mental representations are social representations  
The individual representations of a so-called same social representation vary slightly in 
content or pattern from subject to subject. And, as can be empirically assessed, some of those 
differences can be systematically linked to specificity of the subject (e.g. gender, age, social 
class...). For instance, Lahlou (1992, 1995) showed that, although the social representation of 
« eating  well» is similar within the French population, some aspects of the representation are 
more developed in some segments of the population. The nuclei of « desire » and « filling 
up » are more developed in the young, while the elderly develop health aspects with the 
nucleus of « not too much fat or sugar », etc. This type of result, where the basic nuclei of the 
representation are more or less developed and salient depending on the situation of the 
subject, is common in representation studies (e. g. : Di Giacomo 1980, Guimelli 1994). 
This raises the problem of the limit of the social representation, which is a fuzzy object.  
Whorf (1927) introduced the terms connection to distinguish between the associations that 
are idiosyncratic to a subject, and connections which are systematic associations within a 
population. It seems that this distinction is a good way to recognize, empirically, what can be 
considered as « social representation », and what cannot, but can only be considered as 
individual mental representation. In this perspective, social representations are the common 
part of internal representations, as assessed by the observer. As stated earlier, the empirical 
approaches derived from the social representation core theory have come up with 
investigation methods that allow dealing with that problem. 
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5.3. The complexity of the social representations 
Our model is too simple to account for the construction from scratch of the attested, complex, 
real social representations, as observed in the wild. There is a technical impossibility of 
building a formal model that could compute social representations in their richness. Human 
social representations are products and nurture for the human mind, and what is known of the 
complexity of brain physiology is enough to discourage any sort of full scale modeling of its 
process with the only tool of words written on paper.  
Albeit this limitation, the model can be useful if taken as an image of an incremental process 
of collective representation building. What it cannot account for at once, it can account for by 
iteration. 
Even when staying within the narrow boundaries of the model, providing that they start with a 
large number of cognems (e.g. : their perceptions) Ego and Alter can progressively construct 
together a common world containing a large quantity of social representations, some of which 
may be very complex. For the system works by accretion : any existing representation can be 
used just as another cognem, and be connected to others in order to construct a new 
representation. This, in a virtually endless combinatory process since, as we have stated, 
creating a new combination does not destroy the existing ones. In this respect, representation 
propagation is far superior to any material system, whose dissemination is limited by the law 
of mass conservation. And, indeed, cultures are very complex sets of representations, 
replicated in very numerous individual representational worlds of the subjects which 
constitute the cultural population.  
This progressive aspect can account for such an epidemiology of such complex patterns as are 
observed in the wild. One should bear in mind that what we have described, with a simple 
model, takes places continuously during an individual’s life, allowing him or her to construct 
representations of millions of objects ; objects which are constantly confronted with the 
environment or other subjects’ representations. Only this permanent modeling of the 
individual representational world to the subject’s environment ensures the persistence of a 
content of his inner world compatible with the outside worlds, including the worlds of the 
other humans. To give an order of magnitude : we have manipulated in our figures a dozen 
signs, where a human brain contains more billion of neurons. If we represented the visual 
experience of a twelve year old kid with a continuous 35 mm film at the usual cinema speed 
of 24 frames per second, the film would be about 800 000 km long, enough to go to the Moon 
and back. So, our 8 cm schema is a rather simplified model. But one can imagine that, 
repeated and combined billions of times, the combination and binding of cognems may 
eventually yield the complex representations that we can observe in the everyday life. 
5.4. Replication is only approximate 
As stated earlier, Ego and Alter do not, probably, dispose of the exact same set of cognems. 
Nor do they link exactly the same set of cognems (cj) with the same set of signs (sj). For, as 
Cyrulnik (1989, p. 84) writes : 
« (...) a living being can perceive, through the lens of its internal world, only the data that his 
sensory and neurological equipment can process. Each objective world is therefore different 
from one individual being to another, since our sensory organs and our brains are different »  
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What is true from species to species is also true from a specific human to another, since their 
individual histories (and hence memories) are different. This state of affairs implies that 
replication of the representation will not be perfect from subject to subject. In other words, the 
representation undergoes a small mutation when replicating. This mutation, which justifies 
considering social representations as populations of individual representations (Lahlou, 
1995), has interesting consequences in their adaptive capacities.  
As social representations are a means of surviving by producing efficient actions, adequate to 
the environment (e.g. : not drinking from the finger-bowl, although some representations have 
a more dramatically selective role!), the existence of a large number of variants facilitates the 
evolution of the global population or individual representations towards more efficiency. For 
humans favor to host efficient representations, and spend a large amount of time « seeking for 
information », that is, trying to select for their internal representational fauna the best 
representatives available ; just like Darwin’s pigeon breeders did with their birds. 
 
6. Social representations, context, and social constructionism 
Accepting the hypothesis that representations can replicate so easily, one would be tempted, 
adopting a completely idealistic view, to propose a social constructionist view of reality, 
uniquely based on representations. In this perspective, humans would collectively build a 
common Umwelt constituted only of social representations. This standpoint is appealing for it 
allows describing all objects, material or not, with the same formalism, and can be developed 
with some coherence if applied to description of the world by a given observer (e.g. : 
"Thomas"). Which is, in fact, the general case, for description is always description by a 
given observer. Still, pragmatic approach suggests that it may be more practical to continue 
distinguishing a « reality », which can be defined as the set of objects common to a 
population, immaterial and material, even if further research may someday prove that the 
latter are a subset of the former. 
We shall here give a short example, more realistic than the model, of how representations 
propagate. This description will not only involve the social representations, but the context in 
which they occur. For no representation can be isolated from the global setting in which it is 
produced and with which it interacts in the course of global social evolution. 
6.1. Language is not a transparent tool 
Investigation on the social representation of « eating » in the French population, by statistical 
analysis of lexical data (1) obtained by free association on the terms « manger » and « bien 
manger » on several French samples ranging from 1600 to 2000 subjects (Lahlou, 1993, 1994, 
1995) showed that social representation of eating in France is made of 6 elements, or nuclei : 
desire (libido), take, food, meal, filling up, living. These nuclei are easily understandable, 
their link to the physiological sequence (libido/intake/food/filling up) oriented towards living, 
and the human way of socializing this intake in meals needs little comment.  
The basic structure of this representation can be accounted for by the first fold of our model, 
which states that representation can emerge spontaneously from association of cognems that 
actualize as a pattern in the field of attention. It seems here that the pattern could have been 
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built by repeated chaining of couples of states which usually occur in a sequence : 
libido/intake, intake/food/ intake/filling up, intake/meal, food/meal. The link between living 
and the rest seems to be a mental reconstruction.  
Considering this pattern, we note that natural social representations, at the level at which we 
study them, seem to connect together objects (the nuclei) larger than elemental cognems. In 
fact, each of those cognems/nuclei is a representation in itself. Each nucleus connects into a 
network a large set of more or less similar elements, something like a paradigm. As an 
illustration, here are (translated from French) some of the numerous words that were clustered 
by our software as typical elements of the nucleus « food » : food, feed, bread, nourishment, 
diet, sustenance, supply, milk, dietetic, element, meat, nutri (-tion, -ent), breast, sour, sweet, 
cake, soup, vegetable, product, water, berevage, fresh, animal, fruit, lean, egg.... 
 
Whether the connections that emerge from the verbal material were constructed 
independently by each individual is doubtful. These connections exist in the culture, 
materialized by the very structure of the semantic network common to all speakers. This can 
be proved by an analysis with the same method on a corpus of about 1,4 Megaoctets obtained 
by concatenating some 540 definitions of the term « to eat » and its synonyms or associates, 
and synonyms of its synonyms, as yielded by an analogical dictionary, Le Grand Robert 
(Lahlou, 1995). In this investigation, the dictionary is considered as a typical representative of 
culture, submitted to a free association protocol similar to the one applied to human subjects. 
We obtained the same structure of the social representation, although richer and more fine-
grained than live Humans’ because of the didactic style of the dictionary and its large 
vocabulary, which exceeds by far the lexicon of the layman.  
The fact that both sources (dictionary and subjects) yield similar patterns of social 
representation, strengthens the social representation theory. But it also shows what a complex 
hen-and-egg problem the study of representation propagation has to face. For no human is 
born in a desert, and the very communication tools he uses, to build up and to express his 
representations, already contain implicitly some pattern. 
Detailed analysis of the structure yielded by the dictionary showed that some nuclei contained 
elements whose presence can only be explained by a long term hysteresis, tracing back 
centuries, and in some cases probably much more. For example, remains of the Hippocratic 
philosophy are still present in the associations observed (Lahlou, 1994). So, when 
investigating and « old » representation (unlike what Moscovici could do with 
psychoanalysis, for example) we must be aware that it may carry in its structure traces of a 
long history that has been embedded in the language, and in the very elements the 
representation is made of : nothing is ever fully new, and representations are made of 
recycled, recombined, pre-existing representations.  
 
6.2. Context is also what representations are made of 
On this same topic of eating behavior, we tried to understand how circulation of information 
in the media would reflect or modify the representations. Therefore, we collected nearly 300 
articles published in the press (daily newspapers, and newsmagazines) about the topic during 
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a period of three years, and submitted them to content analysis with the same statistical 
method described in the last section (Lahlou, 1996).  
It is interesting to note that the structure obtained is different from the one obtained on the 
human subjects and dictionary. Two of the seven « classes » (it would not be correct to speak 
of « nuclei », since the data collection method, very different from free association, is not 
designed to obtain a representation pattern but rather a collection of topics) obtained are 
similar to the food and meal nuclei already described. The five others enlighten the stakes 
behind the production of information and representation, and are instructive because they 
stress the game of actors that constitute the context. Two classes are about the 
macroeconomic determinants of the food sector ; one presenting the evolution of industrial 
offer world-wide, the other the innovation of French firms. This traces the information flux by 
which actors and institutions try to inform, and influence, others ; by lobbying or trying to 
impose their conceptual framework, e.g. on European market politics. 
Three other classes describe aspects of food consumption in the population. One, centered on 
the nutritional aspects, contains a medical discourse, with repressive tones, insisting on risks 
and prescriptions (e.g. : do not eat cholesterol). Another, describing consumer behavior, 
diffuses results of market studies and describes the tendencies of the French market. The 
legitimating effect, as evidenced by the frequency of experts’ quotations, is important in this 
discourse that contributes to creating a representation of what the French consumer wants, in 
the minds of producers and retailers. The last class describes cultural aspects of the eating 
behavior. It is interesting to note that, as detailed analysis shows, the primary sources of the 
information are very few. For example, the last class has been constructed mainly by 
quotations or interviews and comments of the work of a single researcher who had just 
published a (successful) book on food sociology !  
 
The discourses circulating in a public space, of which those articles are a trace, contribute to 
influence the various populations which are their targets. Quantitative measurement of this 
influence is an impossible challenge, since it is difficult to separate their influence from other 
factors But many clues tend to prove influence in the long run. For instance, the persistent 
core of the dietetics discourse (eating varied and balanced) can now be found as a dominant 
trait in the free associations of French subjects on « eating well ». This core replaces 
repletion, which used to be the major trait of the representation, according to qualitative 
studies conducted in the 1950’s, and which now remains salient only among rural 
populations. 
More interesting than the potential influence of these discourses is the vast system of 
reciprocal influences they reveal, giving more flesh to a social constructionist model, and 
enlightening in a new way the notions of anchoring and objectivation introduced by 
Moscovici in his seminal work. 
 
6.3. The co-construction of material reality and representations 
A human society needs, as we have stated in the beginning of this article, a common reality. 
From the standpoint of the individual, sharing this set of representations is necessary to 
14 
survive in a complex environment. In this respect, representations are an encyclopedia of the 
world, that can be activated into action scripts, a kind of « user’s manual » of the social 
reality, that every participant must know. So each actor knows how to play his part 
(Goffmann, 1973). But, from an aerial view, this set of representations also appears as a 
master plan for labor division, enabling social co-operation on a large scale : each individual, 
having his own version of the master plan, can play his own part.  
What the (too short) evocation of the various pieces of information that actors exchange 
through communication media teaches us is that there is a continuous effort of global and 
decentralized negotiation, by which actors (individuals, firms, institutions etc..) try to know 
what others do and want, on one hand, and try to influence the others by getting them to share 
their views. In this continuous process, each actor brings into the common field of public 
representation the product of his activity : new combinations of representations (e.g. : medical 
or sociological knowledge on eating behavior), or new artifacts (e.g. : food products). All 
those objects, material or immaterial, are symbolically processed in a common U-language (of 
which the media articles studied are only a part : buying acts, for example, are another, which 
appears through market statistics). In the great hen-and-egg process that follows, each actor 
modifies his representations and activities. For example, consumers will look for low-fat 
products, and firms will design, produce, and retail such foods, which in turn will modify the 
foraging environment of the consumer, modify his practice and anchor them in reality. So, 
reality is indeed collectively co-constructed, and representations are a medium in this co-
construction since they contribute to design action in the material. Anchoring, objectivation, 
can then be seen as different ways of describing a single feed-back mechanism : 
representations are constructed by anchoring in reality, and reality is constructed by turning 
representations into artifacts (the reason why firms will design low-fat foods is because their 
marketing services have a representation of the consumer as someone who will buy low-fat 
foods).  
Reality contains patterns of elements that representations are made of (e.g. : « food »). It is so 
because, as we saw, reality propagates its own structures into the structures of social 
representation. On the other hand, representations contain patterns of elements of which 
reality is made of, because, as we just suggested, through the behavior of actors representation 
gets materialized into artifacts (e.g. : food products). It seems that reality and social 
representations contain the same patterns, more or less. In this « more or less », constituted of 
the difference between individual representation and social representation, and of the 
mutations and translation errors that occur in the process of pattern propagation, probably lies 
the key of a dialectic evolutionary process. In this process, the same objects successively play 
the role of pattern in a context, or part of the context.  
7. An evolutionist perspective 
The finality, if there is any, of the representation system, and of our socially constructed 
reality, is to provide that society can continue existing, collectively and as a set of individuals. 
In this respect, representations are a means to propagate the patterns of reality (the common 
context) so that every part of this complex system can adapt to the context. The immaterial 
nature of representations facilitates this dissemination at low costs and fast speed. It allows 
15 
adaptation to be done in the field of U-languages, by « thought experiments ». E.g. to test 
what concept of food I, as a manufacturer, should design, it is less costly to compare the 
representation of the food to the representation of the consumer. Representations allow 
planning action. They also allow capitalizing experience of others. By all these features, 
representations allow a faster and more economical evolution and co-ordination of the global 
society. What social representations bring is a collective negotiation and cross-validation. The 
cross-validation ensures that the mental representations that individuals manipulate are indeed 
representative of the global context in which action will take place. Conformity of individual 
representation to the social representation tends to guarantee its ecological validity as a good 
representative of « reality » -the collective context. 
As we suggested, this adaptation of the social representation to the context comes from its 
nature as a « species » constituted of a population of individual representations hosted by the 
human population. By constant mutation at the individual level, and fast propagation of the 
adapted mutants, this population of representations is more likely, at every moment, to be 
mostly constituted of representatives that have a good fitness, that is are efficient models of 
what they stand for. For example, a fit representation of « a good food product » will be a 
model of what consumers, producers, medical institutions etc. want for their own purposes 
(satisfaction, profitability, health, etc.). This fitness is a result of the global negotiation 
between actors like the one we have evoked taking place through the market and the media. It 
is a global fitness for the whole society, since it is a compromise between all actors.  
 
To conclude, we propose to consider social representations as domestic species, and as an 
evolutionary tool at the scale of human societies. This tool is twofold : at the individual level, 
it enables the actor to survive in his environment. At the collective level, it enables co-
operation and labor division. We suggest that the replication process by which representations 




(1) The method aims at spotting the basic nuclei of social representation, in the discourse 
produced by an informed source. First, a corpus of statements (sentences in natural language), 
about the same object (here : "eating") is obtained through the free association technique. The 
sentences obtained are aggregated into a single corpus. The corpus is processed with a 
statistical analysis of lexical data software, ALCESTE (Reinert, 1987, 1993), that yields 
classes of statements that have similar lexical content.  
Those semantic classes are considered to be the basic nuclei of the social representation. This 
method is a kind of quantified, detailed, content analysis. Technically, classes are built on the 
principle of putting together statements that are close to each other within a cluster (analogy) 
and different from statements in other clusters (contrast). Analogy and contrast are made on 
the bases of significant traits. In our case, the traits will be lexical (lemmatized or 
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